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Social Connectedness  
and Generalized Trust: 
A Longitudinal Perspective 
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
Social, or „generalized‟, trust refers to beliefs that people hold about how other people in 
society will in general act towards them. Can people in general be trusted? Or must one be 
careful in dealing with people? This type of „thin‟, or „horizontal‟ trust is different from the 
kind that people invest in family, friends, colleagues, acquaintances, and institutions that are 
known to them. Social trust is more like a core value or belief; an abstract evaluation of the 
moral standards of the society in which we live. This kind of trust is usually regarded as a 
good thing, because it makes it easier for people to co-operate without the need for strict 
contracts, regulation and enforcement. As Stolle puts it, trust is “a key social resource that 
seems to oil the wheels of the market economy and democratic politics” (Stolle 2003 p19).  
 
Because trust is so often seen as a good thing, it is important to understand why some people 
trust more than others and therefore understand how it might be possible to increase social 
trust in the population. A great deal of research has been focussed on this topic but our 
contention in this paper is that much of it is hampered by severe methodological limitations. 
In particular, the predominant reliance on cross-sectional survey data means that we cannot 
be sure that the things that appear to be related to trust are the real causes of differences in 
trust between individuals. In this paper we try to overcome some of these limitations by using 
longitudinal data that captures changes in people‟s levels of trust over time. We can then 
examine how some of the putative causes of trust relate to these changes. In so doing, we can 
rule out many of the potential confounding influences that have not been measured in 
previous studies and thereby enable us to make a more robust evaluation of what might really 
be important.  
 
In particular, we assess the influence of a particularly prominent mooted cause of trust: the 
degree to which individuals are socially integrated via formal membership of civic 
organisations and voluntary groups but also through informal social networks that exist 
between friends and neighbours. We do this by fitting a range of statistical models to repeated 
measures data from the UK for the period 1998 to 2008. Our results show little support for 
the widely held view that social trust results from integration within social networks, of either 
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Social, or ‗generalized‘, trust refers to beliefs that people hold about how other 
people in society will in general act towards them. Can people in general be trusted? 
Or must one be careful in dealing with people? Research on the antecedents of social 
trust has typically relied on cross-sectional regression estimators to evaluate putative 
causes. Our contention is that much of  this research over-estimates the importance of 
many of these causes because of the failure to account for unmeasured confounding 
influences. In this paper we use longitudinal data to assess the causal status of a 
particularly prominent mooted cause of trust: the degree to which individuals are 
socially integrated via formal membership of civic organisations and through 
friendship networks. We fit a range of regression estimators to repeated measures data 
from the UK for the period 1998 to 2008. Our results show little support for the 
widely held view that social trust results from integration within social networks, of 
either a formal or an informal nature. 
  






Social, or ‗generalized‘ trust relates to beliefs held by individuals in a given society 
about the moral orientation and incentive structure of a diffuse, unknown ‗other‘ 
(Delhey and Newton 2005). This type of ‗thin‘, or ‗horizontal‘ trust must be 
differentiated from the instrumental, ‗strategic‘ trust we invest in family, friends, 
colleagues, acquaintances, and institutions that are known to us (Hardin 1999; Putnam 
2000; Uslaner 2002). While strategic trust is developed over time through direct 
personal experience, social trust is more akin to a core value or belief; an abstract 
evaluation of the moral standards of the society in which we live (Delhey and Newton 
2003). To the extent that individuals within a society are inclined to make positive 
evaluations of the trustworthiness of their fellow citizens, various normatively benign 
consequences may be expected to follow at both the individual and societal levels. 
This is because social trust is postulated to facilitate co-operative behaviour in the 
absence of information about the trustworthiness of the ‗other‘. This type of diffuse 
trust, it is argued, reduces social and economic transaction costs by lowering the need 
for contracts, legal and regulatory frameworks, and other forms of coercive authority 
(Hardin 1999; Luhmann 1979)
1
. It has been posited as the key mechanism through 
which dis-connected individuals with divergent preferences can overcome collective 
action problems (Arrow 1974; Fukayama 1995; Parsons). As Stolle puts it, trust is ―a 
key social resource that seems to oil the wheels of the market economy and 
democratic politics‖ (Stolle 2003 p19).  
If trust is key to the attainment of social and economic prosperity, it goes 
without saying that we should devote serious attention to understanding how it might 
be nurtured, developed, and maintained. The case for deepening our understanding of 
the origins of trust is all the more compelling in the context of its apparent precipitate 
decline in advanced western democracies during the latter part of the twentieth 
century (Hall 1999; Putnam 2000; Robinson and Jackson 2001).  Our contention in 
this paper is that much of the existing body of research into the causes of social trust 
is hampered by limitations of methodology and data. In particular, the predominant 
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 Though see Cook, Hardin and Levi (2005) for the multifarious ways in which cooperation can exist in 
the absence of trust. 
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reliance on cross-sectional regression estimators is likely to result in substantial over-
estimation of the true effect of putative causes.  
Our contribution is both methodological and substantive. Methodologically, 
we show that conclusions based on cross-sectional regression can be fundamentally 
altered once appropriate defence against unobserved confounding variables is 
introduced. Substantively, we assess the causal status of a particularly prominent 
mooted cause of trust in the theoretical literature – the degree to which individuals are 
socially integrated via formal membership of civic organisations and voluntary groups 
but also through informal social networks that exist between friends and neighbours. 
We do this by fitting a range of regression estimators to repeated measures data from 
the UK for the period 1998 to 2008. Our results show little support for the widely held 
view that social trust results from integration within social networks, of either a 
formal or an informal nature. We begin with a review of the relevant literature, before 
describing our data, key measures and analytical strategy. We then present our results 
and conclude with a discussion of their implications for our understanding of the 
relationship between both formal and informal social connections and generalised 
trust. 
 
SOCIAL CONNECTIONS AND TRUST 
Discussions about interpersonal trust and its correlates very often take place in the 
context of the wider notion of social capital. An enormous quantity of theoretical and 
empirical work on social capital has appeared in recent decades, and the concept has 
found its way into the lexicons of government and policymakers, as well as of 
sociologists, economists, political scientists and those working in other academic 
disciplines. Although definitions of social capital are varied, the essential idea behind 
the concept is that social networks are useful. For individuals, this means that social 
investments have expected positive returns (Lin 2001). Although one can view the 
accumulation of social capital as a rational goal (Coleman 1988a), it may be acquired 
simply as a by-product of making affective ties with people in a non-instrumental 
manner (Crow 2004). We can distinguish between two types of network that can yield 
such returns: informal and formal. The former are identified in the literature as 
predominantly friendship or extended familial networks (Granovetter 1973). The 
latter are composed of participation in formally constituted civic organisations 
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(Putnam 2000). Membership of either type of network could be advantageous in a 
host of different ways, for example enhanced job opportunities, greater resilience to 
economic and social hardship, better mental health and wellbeing.  
Where does trust enter into this conceptual network? The idea that generalised 
trust emerges from the formal networks of civil society has a long and venerable 
history (Almond and Verba 1963; de Tocqueville 1835; Mill 1937; Simmel 1903). 
The essence of the idea is that those who join various types of civic association 
gradually conform to in-group norms of co-operative behaviour, learning the benefits 
of interpersonal reciprocity and trust via direct personal experience (Newton and 
Norris 2000).  However, it also seems obvious that some pre-existent degree of trust is 
required before a citizen could reasonably join formally constituted civic organisation. 
To take Putnam‘s example of American bowling leagues: one would be unlikely to 
join without some expectation that other members will not cheat, steal the 
membership fees and so on. It is a more open question as to how generalized trust 
might relate to informal networks. The same positive reinforcement may occur 
through repeated exposure. Or it may be that reliance on small friendship groups, for 
instance in areas where there are few opportunities for formal participation in civil 
society, may actually bolster distrust in generalized others, while raising the worth of 
in-group co-operation. Even for formal civic organisations, the experience of 
membership may not necessarily be positive, for instance local political organisations 
may encourage cronyism that favours some members over others (Portes 1998). 
 
It seems evident, then, that trusting and joining are likely to be related in some 
way. However, the nature of the relationship - whether causal or not and under which 
conditions it may exist - is less clear. Empirical research to date certainly provides 
substantial evidence in favour of a relationship but it is generally weak on the 
identification of a causal effect of social connections on the propensity to trust. 
Numerous studies find membership of civic associations to be correlated with social 
trust at the individual level (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Brehm and Rahn 1997; 
Hooghe and Derks 1997; Soroka, Johnston and Banting 2005; Stolle and Rochon 
1999), although others find no relationship at all, once appropriate controls are 
introduced (Allum et al. 2010; Claibourn and Martin 2000; Delhey and Newton 2003; 
Li, Pickles and Savage 2005; Mayer 2003; Uslaner 2002; Whiteley 1999; Wollebaek 
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and Selle 2002). Part of the heterogeneity in the evidence on trusting and joining 
might be due to the way that membership of formal networks has been 
operationalized. Time spent engaged in these networks may be more important than 
simply noting the number of different organisations of which citizens are members 
(Andersen, Curtis and Grabb 2006; Stolle 1998). And some researchers distinguish 
both between active and passive membership and between ‗isolated‘ and ‗connected‘ 
organisations, finding relationships between trusting and joining under particular 
conditions (Mascherini, Vidoni and Manca 2010; Paxton 2007; Sonderkov 2010; 
Stolle and Rochon 1998; Wollebaek and Selle 2002). 
Informal social networks and day-to-day interaction with neighbours, 
colleagues and acquaintances have also been examined in relation to trust, although 
less often. (Li, Pickles and Savage 2005; Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000). In a recent 
paper, Li et al (2008) find some evidence for a correlation between informal 
friendship network heterogeneity and social capital in the UK. In particular, they find 
that upwardly socially mobile citizens who gain high status friends tend to be more 
trusting. 
Formal and informal social connections can interact, or assume different 
relevance for different social groups or cultures. For example, Firdmuc and Gerxhani 
(2005) show, using Eurobarometer survey data, that while women in some countries 
are less likely to have formal associational ties, or networks that can provide a job, 
they are more likely than men to have support networks that can help if they feel 
depressed or if they need to borrow money. In a similar vein, Pichler and Wallace 
(2007) show that the pattern of trusting and joining in Europe varies systematically 
according to region. They find high levels of formal and informal social capital in 
North-West Europe, high levels of informal social capital in Eastern Europe, and 
neither kind in Southern Mediterranean Europe. Such evidence is indicative of the 
empirical associations between trust and informal and formal social connectedness, 
but casts little or no light on cause and effect, even though the implicit or explicit 
presupposition of most studies is that interacting with others in either formal or 
informal settings leads to greater levels of trust and, by implication, social capital 
(Newton and Norris 2000).  
However, as we have suggested at the outset of this paper, a fundamental 
limitation of this and the other evidence marshalled in support of the effects of social 
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connections on interpersonal trust relates to the indeterminacy of the data and 
statistical models generally employed. The vast majority of extant investigations rely 
almost entirely on cross-sectional survey data. Because of the well-known inferential 
limitations of this kind of static, observational data (Halaby 2003; Morgan and 
Winship) we cannot be confident that the identified relationships, though robust, are 
not spurious. This concern cannot be dismissed as the pedantry of ―the quibbling 
econometrician‖ (Glaeser 2001), because any evidence suggesting that factors such as 
social networks, income, and occupational status cause trust are undermined by the 
very real possibility that some unmeasured characteristic is the true cause of the 
observed associations. In short, the majority of the empirical evidence relating formal 
and informal social connections to the generation of social trust suffers from 
potentially severe endogeneity bias (Berry 1984; Hausman 1978). 
We make no claim for originality in drawing attention to this problem. Indeed, 
following an initial focus on understanding the ontological status of trust and mapping 
its longitudinal and comparative trajectory in advanced democracies (Barber 1983; 
Berg 1996; Coleman 1990; Coleman 1988b; Hall 1999; Paxton 1999; Putnam 2000; 
Robinson and Jackson 2001; Whiteley 1999), more recent attention has focussed on 
the question of how social trust is generated, or conversely, how it can be eroded over 
time (Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Uslaner 2002). These are causal questions and it seems 
clear that, if we are to develop satisfactory answers, we must move beyond cross-
sectional analysis, to incorporate research designs that provide greater leverage on the 
crucial issue of causal identification.  
 
A LONGITUDINAL PERSPECTIVE 
A potentially fruitful strategy for improving understanding of the causes of social trust 
is to make use of panel (or ‗repeated measures‘) data. The primary advantage of panel 
data is that, under certain model specifications, it is possible to partial out all observed 
and unobserved time-invariant characteristics of individual units (Allison 1994; 
Halaby 2003; Halaby 2004; Wooldridge 2002). As Halaby puts it, ―the problem of 
causal inference is fundamentally one of unobservables, and unobservables are at the 
heart of the contribution of panel data to solving problems of causal inference‖ (2003, 
p2). The incorporation of a longitudinal dimension yields crucial additional leverage 
on questions of causal order, making it possible to model within-individual change as 
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a function of preceding ‗events‘ (Allison 1994).  Because this approach is based on 
the analysis of change in both dependent and independent variables within individuals 
over time, the estimated model coefficients are purged of the effects of all fixed (or 
‗time-invariant‘) respondent characteristics. Such fixed characteristics comprise both 
the obvious, ‗usual suspects‘ such as gender, age cohort, and ethnicity, as well as less 
easily measurable variables such as personality traits and pre-adult socialization 
experiences. 
A small number of studies in the existing literature have utilised repeated 
measures data to examine the causes and consequences of trust (Claibourn and Martin 
2000; Li, Pickles and Savage 2005; Stolle and Hooghe 2004a) The primary focus of 
these studies has been on the relationship between, as Claibourn and Martin pithily 
put it, ―trusting and joining‖, or the effect of the formal, generalised variant of trust 
(social trust) on the similar variant of social connection (membership in voluntary 
organisations). Using the Michigan Socialization Study (Jennings et al. 2004) 
Claibourn and Martin find weak evidence of an effect of trust on later membership
2
 
but no effect of membership on the subsequent propensity to trust. Using the same 
data, Stolle and Hooghe (2004b) extend Claibourn and Martin‘s analysis to find that 
parental trust and membership influence children‘s subsequent trust and membership, 
net of children‘s own previous levels of trust and membership. Li et al (2005) find no 
effect of membership on later trust, once previous levels of trust are controlled. 
However, they do find significant direct effects of neighbourhood attachment and 
social networks on subsequent levels of social trust. Although these investigations 
make use of repeated measures of social trust, all three are limited to just two waves 
of data and only Claibourn and Martin (2000) use measures of change on both sides of 
the equation. This reduces their effectiveness in dealing with omitted variable bias, 
relative to a specification which includes within-individual variance on both sides of 
the regression equation (Allison 2005).  
 
                                                     
2
 The evidence is indeed weak as is it is found only in the ‗parent‘ and not the ‗child‘ sample. Even the 
parental effect is found only in the synchronous, not the lagged effects. The synchronous effects require 
instrumental variables of unknown status for the purpose of identification. 
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DATA AND MEASURES 
Data for this analysis come from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The 
BHPS is a large-scale panel study covering a wide range of topics including 
household composition, labour market experience, educational attainment, physical 
and mental health, and social and political attitudes. At wave 1 of the survey, which 
was conducted in 1991, interviews were completed with a total of approximately 
5,500 households and 10,300 individuals. The BHPS has a stratified, multi-stage 
random sample design, with interviews conducted annually via Computer Assisted 
Personal Interview (CAPI) with all household members aged 16 and above (see Banks 
et al (2005) for a detailed account of the BHPS sample design and data collection 
methodology). Our analyses are based on the 10,264 Original Sample Members 
(OSMs) who participated in the survey between 1991 and 2008. We exclude 
temporary or booster sample members and, to retain sample size, allow participants to 
drop in and out of waves. After taking into account that trust is not measured in every 
wave (see below) in addition to missing values for membership questions, we are left 
with approximately 40,000 observations derived from 8,883 individuals. For the fixed 
effect models these numbers are reduced by approximately half due to individuals 
maintaining a consistent trust response over the period of analysis. 
 
Variables 
Our dependent variable is the standard generalized trust question, which asks 
respondents, ―In general, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can‘t be too careful these days‖. The question was administered in the 1998, 2000 and 
2003, 2005, 2007 and 2008 waves of the survey. Respondents selecting the ‗most 
people can be trusted‘ option are coded 1, those selecting ‗you can‘t be too careful‘ 
are coded 0. Respondents who spontaneously reported ‗it depends‘ (2% over all 
waves) are also coded 0, although dropping these cases from the analysis makes no 
material difference to the results we present here. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics 
for the trust variable for the period covered by the analysis (1998-2008). Two things 
are evident. First, although trust is generally considered to be highly stable at the 
population level over time (Uslaner 2002), the proportion of trusters here exhibits 
quite substantial variation from year to year, ranging from a high of 44% in 2003 to a 
low of 33% in 2008. This pattern suggests that generalised trust is quite sensitive to 
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macro-level shocks in the external environment, although we have no leverage here 
on identifying what these events might have been. Second, and related to the first, 
there is a high level of instability in individual level reports of trust, with nearly half 
of all sample members changing their trust response at least once over the period of 
observation. Although a proportion of this individual level change can no doubt be 
described as random measurement error, we can be confident that there is also a 
substantial degree of real change in trust over time to be explained in our regressions. 
 
Table 1  Descriptive Statistics for Trust Measure 1998-2008 
Year 1998 2000 2003 2005 2007 2008 
Trust = No 4,659 4,609 3,745 4,128 3,666 3,860 
% 60.96 63.07 55.61 64.31 59.90 67.31 
Trust = Yes 2,984 2,699 2,989 2,291 2,454 1,875 
% 39.04 36.93 44.39 35.69 40.10 32.69 
Total 7,643 7,308 6,734 6,419 6,120 5,735 
  
      
Change in trust t-1 
 
1,623 1,568 1,433 1,237 1,275 
% 
 
23.69 25.29 24.07 21.61 22.77 
Total 
 
6,852 6,200 5,935 5,724 5,600 
  
      
No. change 1998 - 2006 
     
3,016 
% 




We use two measures of formal social connections. The first is a count of 
associational memberships reported by the respondent. The BHPS contains questions 
about membership of the following organisations and groups: political parties, trade 
unions, environmental groups, parent associations, tenants/residents groups, religious 
groups, voluntary service groups, community groups, social/working clubs, sports 
clubs, and women‘s groups. Exploratory analysis of the first 10 items (excluding 
women‘s groups because very few men report membership) resulted in a two-
dimensional factor solution, with membership of trade unions, sports groups and 
social clubs loading on a separate factor. Paxton (2007) argues that membership of 
these types of groups is indicative of what she terms ‗isolated‘ membership, to the 
extent that they are weakly correlated with the probability of membership of other 
groups. Paxton finds isolated membership to be unrelated to trust but connected 
membership to be strongly related at both the individual and societal level. The 
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associational membership variable, therefore, excludes these three indicators from the 
model, although the results remain essentially unchanged when all organisational 
types are included. The second measure of formal social connections is a self-report 
of frequency of attendance at religious services and meetings.  Respondents were 
offered the following response alternatives to denote frequency of attendance: Once a 
week or more, Less often but at least once a month, Less often but at least once a year,  
Never or practically, never, Only at weddings, funerals etc. 
We also include two measures of informal social connections, both of which 
measure the frequency of interpersonal contact, rather than the density of networks. 
The first relates to contact with friends and relatives who are not resident with the 
respondent: ‗How often do you meet friends or relatives who are not living with you?, 
the second to frequency of talking to neighbours: ―How often do you talk to any of 
your neighbours?‘ Both questions are answered on a 5 point scale, with the following 
response options: On most days, once or twice a week, once or twice a month, less 
often than once a month, never. For the meeting with friends and relatives question, 
only 24 respondents in the analysis sample used the ‗never‘ category, so this was 
combined with ‗less than one month‘.  Models are estimated with and without the 
following vector of covariates: gender, current financial situation, health status over 
last 12mths, number of children in household, marital status, years of schooling, 
degree status, unemployment status, income quintiles, age and social class 
 
ANALYSIS  
To assess the relationship between formal and informal of social connections and trust 
we estimate panel data regressions, with trust predicted by each of the social 
connection indicators and individual level covariates. The model has the following 
general form: 
 
    (2) 
 
where Pit is trust measured for individual i at time point t,  is a time-specific 





















year.  is a vector of time-invariant covariates,  represents the effect of all time-
invariant unmeasured characteristics of sample members, and  and  are regression 
coefficients to be estimated for, respectively, the time-varying and the time-invariant 
covariate vectors. A parsimonious way of estimating the model in equation (2) is to 
treat the person specific intercept, , as a normally distributed random variable with 
mean zero and variance,   
 , the so-called ‗random effects‘ model (Skrondal and 
Rabe-Hesketh 2004).  
A key assumption of the random effects model is that there is zero correlation 
between  and the covariate vectors, E( |x) =E( | )= 0. In substantive terms, 
this restriction implies that there is zero correlation between the observed covariates 
and all stable but unobserved influences on trust over the time period.  An alternative 
model specification treats , not as a random variable, but as a fixed constant for 
each individual and, thereby, requires no assumptions about the correlation between 
observed and unobserved causes of the outcome. This is the ‗fixed effects‘ estimator 
which, though inefficient relative to the random effects model, provides consistent 
estimates of , even when there is a non-zero correlation between the intercept and 
the independent variables in the model (Allison 2005). The key advantage of the fixed 
effects estimator, then, is that it yields coefficient estimates that are purged of the 
effects of all potential time-invariant confounders, both observed and unobserved. It is 
for this reason that, when the principle threat to valid causal inference relates to 
omitted variable bias, the fixed effects model is to be preferred (Halaby 2004). 
Because our dependent variable here is binary, we use the conditional logit 
estimator
3
 implemented in Stata 10 (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). To test 
whether the random or the fixed effects estimates should be preferred we use the 
Hausman test for omitted variable bias (Hausman 1978). Significant values of the 
Hausman test indicate that the unit heterogeneity in the random effects model ( ) 
has a non-zero correlation with the observed covariates (xit  and ) and that the 
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 Conditional logistic regression is necessary due to the incidental parameters problem which arises in 











parameter estimates for the random effects model are biased by the un-modeled 
influence of omitted variables (Halaby 2004).  
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates and associated standard errors for the six 
models, adjusted for the clustered sample design. Models 1 and 4 are equivalent to a 
standard cross-sectional logit model, with and without controls, respectively. (The 
controls we employ are: gender, current financial situation, health status over last 
12mths, number of children in household, marital status, years of schooling, degree 
status, unemployment status, income quintiles, age and social class.) The purpose of  
 
Table 2  Pooled, Random and Fixed Effect Regression Estimates (logits) 
  No controls With Controls 
  Pooled RE FE Pooled RE FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Formal connections             
Memberships  0.407*** 0.357*** 0.022 0.257*** 0.232*** 0.016 
  (0.023) (0.030) (0.036) (0.023) (0.030) (0.036) 
Religious Attendance 
      (ref=once a week or more) . . . . . . 
at least once a month -0.043 -0.226* -0.128 -0.114 -0.212* -0.125 
  (0.073) (0.102) (0.124) (0.075) (0.101) (0.124) 
at least once a year 0.093 -0.184* -0.035 0.016 -0.133 -0.035 
  (0.065) (0.093) (0.124) (0.066) (0.091) (0.124) 
Never -0.188** -0.467*** -0.087 -0.150* -0.335*** -0.086 
  (0.062) (0.092) (0.128) (0.064) (0.091) (0.128) 
only at weddings, funerals 
etc -0.192** -0.467*** -0.114 -0.182** -0.350*** -0.119 
  (0.060) (0.089) (0.126) (0.062) (0.088) (0.127) 
Informal Connections 
      Talking to neighbours 
      (ref=Most days) . . . . . . 
Once or twice a week 0.090** 0.008 -0.073 -0.053 -0.072 -0.078 
  (0.032) (0.042) (0.047) (0.032) (0.042) (0.047) 
One or twice a month 0.044 -0.018 -0.067 -0.143** -0.120* -0.071 
  (0.044) (0.059) (0.067) (0.045) (0.060) (0.067) 
Less than once a month -0.079 -0.082 0.005 -0.193** -0.149 -0.005 
  (0.060) (0.082) (0.093) (0.062) (0.083) (0.094) 
Never -0.483*** -0.433*** -0.193 -0.442*** -0.381** -0.177 
  (0.085) (0.125) (0.140) (0.089) (0.125) (0.141) 
Meeting People 
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(ref=Most days) . . . . . . 
Once or twice a week 0.142*** 0.128** 0.046 0.042 0.038 0.026 
  (0.028) (0.039) (0.042) (0.029) (0.039) (0.043) 
One or twice a month 0.195*** 0.171** 0.069 -0.017 0.004 0.035 
  (0.046) (0.062) (0.068) (0.047) (0.062) (0.068) 
Less than once a 
month/never 0.035 0.209 0.233 -0.082 0.068 0.201 
  (0.079) (0.111) (0.123) (0.083) (0.111) (0.123) 
Constant -0.617*** -0.741*** 
 
-0.683*** -1.391*** 
   (0.063) (0.095) 
 
(0.115) (0.169) 










 Number of observations 38136 38136 18866 38135 38135 18863 
Number of individuals 8833 8833 3694 8833 8833 3694 
Cluster robust standard errors for pooled logit in parenthesis; * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001.  
 
considering these models is to provide a baseline or ‗standard‘ model against which 
the alternative estimators, which incorporate repeated measures and control for 
unobserved unit heterogeneity, can be compared.  Although there is a one year lag in 
the measurement of the dependent and independent variables in this model, it is still 
essentially cross-sectional, because it makes no use of within-individual variance on 
the either side of the equation. The one year difference between the measurement of 
the independent and dependent variables may, however, lead to a degree of 
attenuation in effect sizes relative to contemporaneous measures.  
 The results of these cross-sectional models support the contention that social 
connections, of both the formal and informal kind, are causal antecedents of trust. We 
are more likely to find trusters amongst those with higher levels of associational 
membership and those who more regularly attend religious ceremonies. Converting 
the logit coefficients to odds ratios shows that the odds of being a truster increase by 
50% for each additional membership reported, a substantively as well as statistically 
significant effect. Including controls in model 4 reduces the size of the coefficient for 
formal memberships by approximately a quarter, although it remains  of substantial 
magnitude (odds ratio = 1.3) and significant at the 99% level of confidence. Similarly, 
the probability of trusting is higher amongst those who talk with their neighbours 
more often, although the pattern of this effect only emerges consistently in model 4, 
which includes covariates.  In model 1, the coefficients for frequency of meeting with 
friends and family outside the household are in the opposite direction to theoretical  
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 expectation, with trust lowest amongst those who report meeting on ‗most days‘, 
although this effect disappears once controls are introduced in model 4, with none of 
the coefficients remaining significant at the 95% level of confidence.  
Turning to the random effects estimates, we can see that they are very similar 
to those obtained using the cross-sectional estimator, although the standard errors are 
consistently larger, as should be expected.  Although the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are not identical, their pattern of direction and significance tell essentially 
the same substantive story; social connections have a positive influence on social 
trust, with formal associational memberships having the strongest effect – a 26% 
increase in the odds of trusting for each additional membership reported. However, 
informal connections also seem to exert a powerful influence, with the odds of 
trusting being 30% lower for those reporting they never talk to their neighbours 
compared to those who report doing this on most days.   
A standard reason for reason for preferring the random effect to cross-
sectional estimators is that it accounts properly for the non-independence of 
observations made on the same individual over time, yielding correct standard errors 
and significance tests, where cross-sectional estimators do not (Halaby 2003). 
However, the parameter estimates of the random effects model are consistent only if 
the key assumption noted earlier - that the observed predictors of trust in the model 
are uncorrelated with unobserved time-invariant causes - is empirically justified 
(Wooldridge 2002). On prima facie grounds, however, it seems unlikely that all 
unmeasured, time-invariant causes of trust over this time period have zero correlation 
with the independent variables in table 2. And, if the true correlation between these 
unobserved causes and the included covariates is non-zero, the random effects 
estimator is biased and inconsistent (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). The Chi 
Square value of the Hausman test in this instance is 135 which, with 25 degrees of 
freedom, is significant at the 99.9% level of confidence. Thus, we must reject the 
random effect assumption and prefer the parameter estimates for the fixed effects 
models. 
The difference between the random and fixed effects estimates in table 2 are 
substantial. Using the fixed effects estimator, we now find that none of the social 
connection variables are significant predictors of trust. Note that the fixed effects 
estimator does not yield estimates for time-invariant variables, which in these models 
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are age and gender (coefficients not shown) because these are perfectly collinear with 
the random intercept, . While the inability to obtain coefficient estimates for time-
invariant variables may be regarded as an important loss of information, it is in fact 
the key benefit of the fixed effects framework (Allison 2005; Halaby 2003; Halaby 
2004). For, in addition to removing the effects of these observed time-invariant 
variables, the model also removes the effect of all unobserved variables which result 
in upwardly biased coefficient estimates in Table 2.  
When the effects of unobserved time-invariant confounders are removed, we 
find both formal and informal social connections to be completely unrelated to trust. 
Of particular note in this regard is the coefficient for formal associational 
memberships. While the estimates for this variable are of substantial magnitude and 
highly significant in both the cross-sectional and random effects models, in the fixed 
effects models they are close to zero and a long way from reaching statistical 
significance at conventional levels of confidence. Thus, the effect of associational 
membership in the cross-sectional estimates derives entirely from between-person 
variance. If we consider the effect of an individual changing his or her level of 
associational membership over time, it has no effect at all on the subsequent level of 
trust. This must lead us to conclude that the strong effect of associational membership 
in the cross-sectional and random effect models, and presumably those with a similar 
specification in the existing literature, are subject to substantial endogeneity bias.  
It is well known, however, that while the fixed effects estimator is consistent 
when  is correlated with the covariate vector, it can also yield considerably less 
precise estimates of  than random effects. This is because fixed effects uses only 
within-person variability and discards information from units whose score on the 
dependent variable remains constant over time. Could the difference in the 
coefficients between the random and fixed effects coefficients simply be due to the 
difference in statistical power between the two models? Although 52% of respondents 
in our analysis sample did not change their trust response over the five waves of 
observation, this nevertheless yielded a sample of 18863 observations across 3694 
individuals, which should yield sufficient power to detect even small associations 
between the social connectedness variables and trust. It seems safe to conclude, 






between estimators in table 2 is due to unobserved variable bias in the cross-sectional 




A key tenet of social capital theory is that norms of reciprocity and trust emerge from 
the formal and informal institutions of civil society (Putnam et al 1993). Citizens 
become more trusting of one another as they experience the benefits of cooperative 
behaviour that is fostered within clubs, societies, and associations but also within less 
formal social networks that exist between friends, relations and neighbours. Enhanced 
trust, in turn, leads people to become more likely to engage in civic institutions in the 
future, creating a virtuous circle between social connectedness and trust (Claibourn 
and Martin, 1997). This process can also unfold in reverse, a phenomenon that 
prominent academics, politicians, and social commentators have identified as being 
partly responsible for the increasing atomisation and socio-political disengagement of 
western citizenries in the latter decades of the twentieth century. These are grand and 
consequential claims. Yet, the vast majority of the evidence base presented in support 
of the idea that formal and informal civic engagement fosters trust is based on either 
descriptive analysis of long-term trends in survey and administrative time-series, or 
on regression models applied to cross-sectional data (Delhey and Newton 2003; 
Putnam 2000). It is well-known that such approaches are susceptible to potentially 
severe biases arising out of the failure to adequately account for unobserved 
confounding variables (Halaby 2004; Morgan and Winship 2007). 
Using conventional cross-sectional regression, our own analysis here lends 
support to the virtuous circle model; we find trusters to have more ‗connected‘ 
associational memberships, to more frequently attend religious services, and to talk 
with their neighbours on a more regular basis. These are not weak effects that rely on 
small p values for claims to be taken seriously. Even when a broad range of controls 
are added to the model, we find that the odds of trusting increase by 25% for each 
additional membership an individual reports. However, when we exploit the true 
value of the repeated measures data available to us – the ability to model within-
person change over time - we find that the cross-sectional estimates are subject to 
substantial upward bias. Because the fixed effects estimator controls for all observed 
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and unobserved fixed characteristics of individual units, the difference in coefficient 
magnitude between the random and fixed effects coefficients can be interpreted as 
resulting from the influence of omitted confounding variables (Halaby 2004). Our 
findings are robust to a number of sensitivity checks relating to the coding and 
treatment of key variables in our analysis, which have not been reported here due to 
limitations of space. For instance, our results remain substantively unchanged if we 
combine the measures of social connectedness in various different ways, including 
specification as latent variables, in order to mitigate random measurement error in the 
predictor variables. Similarly, when we operationalize our measure of associational 
membership as being an ‗active‘ member (rather than just a member), our conclusions 
are not materially altered. 
This type of endogeneity bias can also arise when an outcome variable exerts a 
causal influence on predictor variables. The models we have used here provide only 
limited protection against this possibility, through the use of lagged independent 
variables. And, if the ‗virtuous circle‘ model is to be believed, we should expect the 
right hand side variables in our equations to themselves be affected by changes in 
trust at the individual level. However, while the problem of reciprocal causality is 
certainly an inherent limitation of the approach we have adopted, it is most germane 
when a fixed effects specification shows a significant, rather than a non-significant 
effect. This is because the magnitude of any statistically non-zero coefficient will 
derive, at least in part, from the opposite of the process codified in the statistical 
model. While it is logically possible that non-significant coefficients can also be 
biased through reverse causality, via some complex suppression effect, this would 
appear, on a priori grounds at least, to be rather unlikely in most substantive contexts. 
In our view, then, our results provide no support for a causal effect in either direction 
between trusting and joining.  
Turning to the substantive implications of our findings, our results lend 
support to the view that the correlation between associational membership and trust 
arises from trusters selecting into membership via pre-existing dispositional 
characteristics (Rothstein and Uslaner 2006; Stolle 1998; Uslaner 2002). This begs the 
question of what this characteristic, or characteristics, might be. The general 
unresponsiveness of trust to changes in an individual‘s formal and informal social 
connections over a quite substantial period of time certainly accords with the view 
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that social trust is not so much a rational reaction to ‗the slings and arrows of 
outrageous fortune‘ as it is a general outlook which develops early in the life-course 
and which remains relatively immune to subsequent life-events (Skocpol 2003; Stolle 
and Hooghe 2004b; Uslaner 2002).  This is, of course, a speculation rather than an 
inference from our empirical analysis. It does, though, suggest a useful focus for 
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